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Abstract. In this paper a procedure is developed to modify a non-invariant
solution in such a way that the resulting solution is invariant. Furthermore it
is investigated which properties of the solution are inherited by the modiﬁed
solution.
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1. Introduction
In their seminal paper Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argued that a solution (a
rule that assigns to each game a collection of closed, nonempty sets of strategy
proﬁles) should satisfy certain prescribed requirements. They proposed a list
of seven such requirements and their aim in this paper was to ﬁnd a solu-
tion that satisﬁed each and every one of them. In this search they used what
might be called a standard method to generate such solutions. First of all, they
deﬁned for each game a collection of perturbations, or perturbed games, of
that game. A set of strategy proﬁles of the game is then said to survive small
perturbations if for every (su‰ciently small) perturbation there is an equilib-
rium of the perturbed game close to the set under consideration. Now, a set of
strategy proﬁles is stable if it survives small perturbations and is also minimal
with respect to this property. A solution that assigns to a game its collection of
stable sets is called a stability concept. By choosing di¤erent types of pertur-
bations of a game Kohlberg and Mertens deﬁned three di¤erent types of sta-
bility concepts, namely hyperstability, full stability and KM-stability.
y We would like to thank two anonymous referees and two associate editors. Their comments
helped us to improve the presentation of this article considerably.
One of the requirements proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens stated that
the sets assigned to a given game should only depend on the reduced normal
form of that game. In other words, if two games have the same reduced nor-
mal form, then the solution should assign the same (solution) sets to these two
games.1
In this paper we try to address the following question. Since invariance is
one of the more prominent axioms on the wish list of Kohlberg and Mertens it
is important to know to what extent invariance really is a restrictive require-
ment. Several solution concepts, such as full stability, quasi-stability and BR-
stability (Hillas 1990), were discarded in literature because they violated in-
variance. We however will try to convince the reader that, although there may
well be several other reasons to discard these concepts, it is in fact not too
complicated to ‘‘sculpt’’ invariant versions of those concepts. In other words,
invariance is far less often the bottleneck than literature seems to suggest.
Related to this ‘‘sculpting’’ of solution concepts, we will also address a
method used by Kohlberg and Mertens to turn non-invariant solution sets
into invariant ones. We will explain why their approach does not work in
general and present an alternative, fairly straightforward, procedure that does
work for a wide class of solution concepts. Thus we try to argue that invari-
ance is relatively easy to enforce for many solution concepts including the
above-mentioned ones such as full stability, quasi-stability and BR-stability.
Contents of the paper
Of course, there may be any number of ways to establish our aim2. The
method presented here works for a fairly large class of potential candidates.
We only require the original solution to satisfy four fairly mild conditions.
The ﬁrst three are
(1) each game has at least one solution set,
(2) the Hausdor¤ limit of solution sets is also a solution set and
(3) a closed set containing a solution set is a solution set itself.
These conditions guarantee for example that the modiﬁcation of the original
solution assigns at least one solution set to each game. Moreover, a solution
that assigns to a game the collection of all sets that survive small perturbations
(a stability concept without the ﬁnal minimality requirement) will naturally
satisfy these three conditions.
The fourth condition directly concerns the question to which degree the
original solution already is invariant. Very vaguely speaking, it is of course
clear that the further a solution concept is removed from being invariant, the
more we need to change (or even mutilate) it in order to get something invari-
ant. The fourth condition simply states that the original solution should be
close enough to being invariant for the modiﬁed solution to be still recogniz-
ably similar to the original one. In particular we will show that the modiﬁed
solution inherits all other requirements of the Kohlberg-Mertens program sat-
1 Stronger versions of the invariance conditions are usually preferred nowadays due to a better
understanding of the implications of these conditions in relation to normal forms of extensive
form games.
2 An alternative method is presented in Vermeulen and Jansen (1999). However, this particular
way of doing things only works for a very speciﬁc type of solution concepts.
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isﬁed by the original solution concept. The condition we use is not very restric-
tive and is satisﬁed for example by essentiality, full stability, quasi-stability and
BR-stability.
One ﬁnal remark we would like to make is that there are probably many
other possible ways to modify solutions that will give similar results. In that
sense the speciﬁc choices we make are not always inevitable and that makes
it sometimes hard to argue why these choices are the best choices possible
(and maybe they are not always the best choices possible). Nevertheless, the
method presented here is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst modiﬁcation of non-
invariant solution concepts into invariant ones that combines mathematical
consistency with preservation of all requirements of the Kohlberg-Mertens
program.
Organization of the paper
In section 2 we will introduce the standard game-theoretical notions used
in this paper, as well as the reduced normal form and reduced strategic form
of a game. In section 3 we will subsequently present two notions of invariance
of a solution that are based on these notions of a reduced game. In section
4 we will explain the di‰culties with modifying non-invariant solutions into
invariant ones. In section 5 we present one way of doing this for the special
class of what we call regular solutions. We will show in section 6 that essen-
tiality, best-reply stability and quasi-stability are regular and in section 7 that
our method preserves the requirements of the Kohlberg-Mertens program.
Section 8 concludes with an example of an alternative way of modiﬁcation
that does not preserve backwards induction.
Notation. For x A Rn and h > 0, kxky :¼ maxi AN jxij and BhðxÞ :¼ fy A Rn jkx yky < hg. The Hausdor¤ distance of two compact subsets S and T ofRn
is deﬁned as dHðS;TÞ :¼ inffh > 0 jSHBhðTÞ;THBhðSÞg, where BhðSÞ :¼
6
x AS BhðxÞ.
2. Preliminaries
A(n n-person normal form) game is a pair G ¼ hA; ui such that A :¼ Qi AN Ai
is a product of n non-empty, ﬁnite sets and u ¼ ðuiÞi AN is an n-tuple of func-
tions ui : A ! R. Here N is the set of players and Ai is the set of pure strat-
egies of player i and ui is his payo¤ function. The player set N is assumed to be
ﬁxed throughout the paper. The elements of the set DðAiÞ of probability dis-
tributions on Ai are the mixed strategies of player i. For a (mixed) strategy
proﬁle x ¼ ðxiÞi AN A DA :¼
Q
j DðAjÞ, the (expected) payo¤ function of player
i is deﬁned by uiðxÞ :¼
P
a AA
Q
j xjaj uiðaÞ.
By abuse of notation we will identify a pure strategy a A Ai with the mixed
strategy in DðAiÞ that puts all weight on a. So, Ai will simply be viewed as a
subset of DðAiÞ. Also the pure strategy proﬁles will be denoted by a A A. In
case confusion might occur we will write ai A Ai instead of simply a A Ai.
We also write D ðDiÞ instead of DA ðDðAiÞ) and Di :¼
Q
j0i Dj is the set of
strategy proﬁles for the opponents of player i. Furthermore, ðxijyiÞ A D is the
strategy proﬁle where player i uses yi A Di and his opponents use the strategies
in xi A Di.
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A game in strategic form is a pair hP; vi in which P ¼Qi AN Pi is a product
of polytopes PiHRmi and v ¼ ðviÞi AN is the collection of payo¤ functions
vi : P ! R for each player i A N. These payo¤ functions are assumed to be
multi-a‰ne, which means that
viðpi j lpi þ ð1 lÞqiÞ ¼ lviðpijpiÞ þ ð1 lÞviðpijqiÞ
holds for all pi in Pi, all pi; qi in Pi and all l in ½0; 1. Notice that a normal
form game is a special type of strategic form game.
For player i and a strategy proﬁle x A D
biðxÞ :¼ fyi A Di j uiðxijyiÞb uiðxijziÞ for all zi A Dig
is the set of best replies to x. A strategy proﬁle in the set bðxÞ :¼Qi biðxÞ is
called a best reply to x. Note that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle
x A D with x A bðxÞ. The set of all Nash equilibria of the game G is denoted
by EðGÞ.
For player i, a strategy yi A Di is an admissible best reply to a strategy pro-
ﬁle x A D if there is a sequence ðxkÞk AN of completely mixed strategy proﬁles
in D (i.e. all coordinates are positive) converging to x such that yi A biðxkÞ, for
all k. For a strategy proﬁle x A D, Bai ðxÞ denotes the set of admissible pure best
replies to x. If S is a subset of D, Bai ðSÞ :¼6x AS Bai ðxÞ is the set of admissible
pure best replies to S.
A completely mixed strategy proﬁle x is called e-perfect ðe > 0Þ if xiaa e
for every a A Ai that is not a (pure) best reply to x. A strategy proﬁle x is called
(normal form) perfect if there is a sequence ðekÞk AN of positive real numbers
converging to zero and a sequence ðxkÞk AN converging to x such that xk is
ek-perfect for all k A N. The set of perfect equilibria of the game G is denoted
by PEðGÞ.
3. Various deﬁnitions of invariance
In this paper the invariance of a solution plays a central role. Invariance
reﬂects the intuitive feeling that two equivalent games should in some sense
have the same solution sets. In this section we will brieﬂy discuss two pos-
sible interpretations of this informal statement.
A solution is a mapping s that assigns to a game G a collection of closed,
non-empty subsets of D. The elements of sðGÞ are called solution sets.
Generally speaking, a deﬁnition of invariance of a solution s requires an
answer to the following two questions:
(1) when are two games equivalent?
(2) when two games G and G 0 are equivalent, how do we compare the solu-
tion sets in sðGÞ with those in sðG 0Þ?
The ﬁrst variant of invariance we will discuss is what we will call KM-
invariance. This type of invariance considers two games to be equivalent if
they have the same reduced strategic form. The reduced strategic form of a
normal form game G ¼ hA; ui is a smaller game that is in a speciﬁc sense –
having to do with the notion of payo¤-equivalence of strategies – strategically
equivalent to the original game. It is deﬁned as follows.
Two strategies yi and zi of player i are payo¤-equivalent if for all j and all
x A D
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ujðxijyiÞ ¼ ujðxijziÞ:
Since the identiﬁcation of all payo¤-equivalent strategies in DðAiÞ can be seen
as taking the quotient of DðAiÞ with respect to a linear subspace, the result is a
polytope, say Pi. Furthermore, the quotient maps pi : DðAiÞ ! Pi are linear.
Thus, there exist unique multi-a‰ne maps vi from P :¼
Q
i Pi to R such that
vi ¼ ui  p (where p : D ! P is the map ðpiÞi AN ). It can be checked that the
pair hP; vi is a strategic form game, and it will be denoted by Grsf . The reduced
strategic form is unique up to a‰ne isomorphisms4 (cf. Vermeulen and Jansen
(1997b, 1998)).
Example 1. For the 2 4-bimatrix game
ð1; 1Þ ð1;1Þ ð2;2Þ ð2; 2Þ
ð1;1Þ ð1; 1Þ ð2; 2Þ ð2;2Þ
 
two strategies x and y of player 2 are payo¤ equivalent if and only if
eiAx ¼ eiAy
eiBx ¼ eiBy
(
for all i , x y A L2 :¼ a
1
2
1
2
0
0
2
6664
3
7775þ b
0
0
1
2
1
2
2
6664
3
7775j a; b A R
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;:
The strategy space of player 2 in the reduced strategic form game is the quo-
tient space
fxþ L2 j x A D4g:
The associated quotient map p2 is simply the map p2 : x ! xþ L2. Since no
two pure strategies of player 2 are equivalent, it can easily be seen that the
quotient space can be identiﬁed with a quadrangle. /
Remark: Originally, Kohlberg and Mertens talked about the equivalence of
games in terms of games having the same reduced normal form. This reduced
form of a game can be constructed as follows. Check if there is some pure
strategy of some player that is payo¤-equivalent with some other strategy of
that player. If there is, delete it from the game. Thus we get a new game with
one pure strategy less. Repeat the procedure with this new game, and keep on
repeating the procedure until no such a pure strategy is left. Obviously the
result of this procedure is a normal form game in which no pure strategy is
payo¤-equivalent with any other strategy. It can also be shown that the result-
ing game, up to relabeling of pure strategies, does not depend on the order in
which strategies get deleted (cf. Vermeulen and Jansen (1998)).
Nevertheless, the following result shows that we might as well identify all
payo¤-equivalent strategies.
Theorem 1. Two normal form games have the same reduced normal form if and
only if they have the same reduced strategic form.
4 An a‰ne isomorphism from a polytope PiHRki to a polytope QiHRmi is an a‰ne transfor-
mation Ti from Rki to Rmi such that TiðPiÞ ¼ Qi and the restriction of Ti to Pi is one-to-one.
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Sketch of the proof: We will argue that, up to relabeling of pure strategies,
there is a unique way to construct the reduced strategic form of a game given
its reduced normal form and vice versa.
So, suppose we are given the reduced normal form of a game. Then the
strategy space of the reduced strategic form can simply be constructed by
identifying all payo¤-equivalent strategies with one another. The induced quo-
tient maps yield the tool for deﬁning the payo¤ functions.
Conversely, suppose that the reduced strategic form Grsf ¼ hP; vi of a game
G is given. We can construct (a game that is up to relabeling of pure strategies
identical to) the reduced normal form of G in the following way: take Ai :¼
extðPiÞ. Let fi : DðAiÞ ! Pi be the linear extension of the inclusion map from
Ai to Pi that assigns pi to itself for any pi in Ai. If we write f for the map that
assigns the proﬁle ð fiðxiÞÞi AN in P to the proﬁle ðxiÞi AN in D :¼
Q
i AN DðAiÞ
we can deﬁne the payo¤ function ui : D ! R by
uiððxiÞi ANÞ :¼ við f ððxiÞi ANÞÞ
for ðxiÞi AN . It is straightforward to check that the game hA; ui is indeed iden-
tical to the reduced normal form of G . /
This shows that we can deﬁne the equivalence of games either way, and we
chose to take the one that is in terms of mathematics the easiest one to work
with.
Now we return to the deﬁnition of KM-invariance and the way it addresses
the second question. Suppose that we have two equivalent games G and G 0. In
other words, G and G 0 have the same reduced strategic form. Let p be the
associated quotient map from the strategy space of G to the strategy space of
Grsf and let r be the quotient map from G
0 to Grsf . So we get the following
diagram.
G G 0
p
! !r
Grsf
These maps enable us to compare the solution sets in sðGÞ and sðG 0Þ by means
of their ‘projections’ under p and r. Formally we require that
fpðSÞ jS A sðGÞg ¼ frðTÞ jT A sðG 0Þg:
The solution s is called invariant in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens –
KM-invariant for short – if the above equality holds for all games G and G 0
having the same reduced strategic form.
Remark: The reason why we christened this type of invariance after Kohlberg
and Mertens is the following quote from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) on
page 1012:
In particular, one should therefore also identify any two ‘duplicate’ (i.e.
payo¤-equivalent) mixed strategies. It is in this sense that we will inter-
pret the reduced normal form strategies (i.e. as the equivalence classes
given this identiﬁcation).
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Finally we will give the second deﬁnition of invariance of a solution, simply
called invariance. This second version of invariance, among other types intro-
duced in Mertens (1987), reﬂects the idea that a solution should also behave
well with respect to only a partial identiﬁcation of payo¤ equivalence. Mertens
(1987) deals with ordinality of solutions (we refer to this paper for a very
detailed and convincing discussion of the need to require ordinality). One of the
results in that paper states that the type of invariance we use here, combined
with two other properties, results in a condition that is marginally stronger than
ordinality. For a detailed discussion of the precise di¤erences between these
notions we refer to Vermeulen and Jansen (2000).
The tool we use to describe equivalence of games in this deﬁnition is the
notion of reduction map. A reduction map between two games establishes
the link between strategies in one game and the corresponding strategies in the
other game. In order to formalize this, let G ¼ hA; ui and G 0 ¼ hB; vi be two
games.
Deﬁnition 1. A map f ¼ ð fiÞi AN from D 0 to D is called a reduction map from
G 0 to G , denoted by G 0 !f G , if for every player i,
(1) fi : D
0
i ! Di is a‰ne and onto
(2) vi ¼ ui  f .
The motivation for the use of reduction maps to express equivalence of games
is based on the notion of payo¤-equivalence. It is straightforward to show that
a reduction map f from a game G 0 to a game G preserves payo¤-equivalence,
i.e. two strategy proﬁles x and y in D 0 are payo¤-equivalent if and only if f ðxÞ
and f ðyÞ are payo¤-equivalent in D. A simple consequence of the preservation
of payo¤-equivalence by f is the following result.
Lemma 1. A strategy proﬁle z is a best reply to x in the game G 0 if and only if
f ðzÞ is a best reply to f ðxÞ in the game G .
Thus, two equivalent games have, in a precise sense speciﬁed by the reduc-
tion map f , the same best reply correspondence. And in that sense these games
are considered strategically equivalent. Therefore it is only natural to require
that such games have, also in a very precise sense speciﬁed by f , the same
solution sets. This is done in
Deﬁnition 2. A solution s is called invariant if for every reduction map f from
a game G 0 to a game G
sðGÞ ¼ f f ðTÞ jT A sðG 0Þg:
This version of invariance is weaker than the type of invariance required by
Mertens (1987) in Theorem 2(b) to ensure ordinality. On top of the above
requirement he also needed the inverse image of a solution set to be the union
of solution sets that project down onto the original solution set. See Vermeu-
len and Jansen (1997a, 2000) for a detailed comparison of these notions. It is
however easy to show that invariance implies KM-invariance5.
5 The solution t in the next section is an example of a solution that is KM-invariant, but not in-
variant.
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4. Invariance and the method of Kohlberg and Mertens
In this section we will describe how Kohlberg and Mertens tried to generate
solutions that are KM-invariant and point out the ﬂaw in this method by
means of an example.
Kohlberg and Mertens introduced a method (in the deﬁnition of hyper-
stability) to transform a solution (essentiality in this case) that is not KM-
invariant into one that might be KM-invariant. The same method was used
by Hillas (1990) in the deﬁnition of full stability and stability. On page 1022
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) write
. . . we will say that S is a hyperstable set of equilibria in a game G if it
is minimal with respect to the following property:
ðHÞ S is a closed set of Nash equilibria of G such that, for any equiv-
alent game (i.e. having the same reduced normal form), and for
any perturbation of the normal form of that game, there is a Nash
equilibrium close to S.
So, Kohlberg and Mertens ﬁrst compute the collection of essential sets, i.e.,
closed sets S of strategy proﬁles such that any small perturbation of G has a
Nash equilibrium close to S. Then they specify – using the reduced form of
a game – their method to select a speciﬁc class of essential sets. Finally, they
take the minimal elements of this subclass.
A little bit more general, we could describe this method as follows. Let G
be a game, and let Grnf be its reduced normal form. Given a solution s we say
that a solution set S A sðGÞ is an element of ~sðGÞ if
ðPÞ for every normal form game G 0 having the same reduced normal form as
G and maps f and g with G !f Grnf and G 0 !g Grnf , there exists a solu-
tion set S 0 A sðG 0Þ with f ðSÞ ¼ gðS 0Þ and
ðMÞ there does not exist a proper subset T A sðGÞ of S that also satisﬁes P.
Then Kohlberg and Mertens state that ~s is, at least in the case of hyper-
stability, KM-invariant by deﬁnition. Although we believe that hyperstability
indeed satisﬁes KM-invariance, this is not immediately clear from the above
deﬁnition. Furthermore it is certainly not true for a general solution. To see
this, consider the following
Example 2. We will give a KM-invariant solution t for which the modiﬁed
solution ~t is not KM-invariant. Consider the bimatrix games
ðA;BÞ ¼ ð0; 6Þ ð2; 0Þ ð0; 4Þð4; 0Þ ð0; 6Þ ð0; 4Þ
 
and ðA 0;B 0Þ ¼
2
64 ð0; 6Þ ð2; 0Þ ð0; 4Þð4; 0Þ ð0; 6Þ ð0; 4Þ
ð2; 3Þ ð1; 3Þ ð0; 4Þ
3
75:
Note that ðA;BÞ is the reduced strategic form of ðA 0;B 0Þ, since neither player
of the game ðA;BÞ has payo¤-equivalent strategies. Now we deﬁne the solu-
tion t as follows. For a game G whose reduced strategic form equals ðA;BÞ, let
F ðGÞ denote the collection of reduction maps from G to ðA;BÞ. Then deﬁne
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tðGÞ :¼
fS;Tg if G ¼ ðA;BÞ
fS 0;T 0g if G ¼ ðA 0;B 0Þ
6
f AFðGÞf f 1ðSÞ; f 1ðTÞg else
8><
>:
with
S :¼ ch 23 ; 13
 
; 13 ;
2
3
   fð0; 0; 1Þg;
T :¼ 12 ; 12
 
; ð0; 0; 1Þ  
and
S 0 :¼ ch 23 ; 13 ; 0
 
; 13 ;
2
3 ; 0
   fð0; 0; 1Þg;
T 0 :¼ fðð0; 0; 1Þ; ð0; 0; 1ÞÞg:
Here chðAÞ denotes the convex hull of a set A. For the sake of convenience,
we will only consider t on the class of games that are equivalent to ðA;BÞ.
Now application of the above modiﬁcation to t yields
~tðGÞ :¼
fTg if G ¼ ðA;BÞ
fS 0;T 0g if G ¼ ðA 0;B 0Þ
f f 1ðTÞ j f A FðGÞg else.
8><
>:
It is easy to check that ~t is not a KM-invariant solution. This highlights one
of the problems concerning the above modiﬁcation: the sets S and f 1ðSÞ are
thrown away in the process while S 0 A tðA 0;B 0Þ remains. /
Naturally, the solution t in the Example is a rather artiﬁcial one. It is however
not immediately clear why e¤ects like the above cannot occur for a more
natural solution like e.g. essentiality.
5. Modifying solutions
Now we describe a procedure to modify certain solutions in such a way that
the resulting solution is invariant. First we introduce the class of solutions for
which we deﬁne our procedure. Although the characterization of this class is
formulated in general terms, the intentions of this paper are deﬁnitely geared
towards solutions that are developed in the theory of strategic stability, such
as essentiality, stability in the sense of Hillas and quasi-stability.
The idea that these solutions do not behave too badly w.r.t. invariance is
captured in the second requirement. The requirements (1) and (3) will only be
used to guarantee the non-emptiness of the modiﬁed solution. The necessity
of requirement (4) is harder to pin down to one argument, since it is used
throughout the paper. In most cases it is needed to guarantee that the inverse
images of certain solution sets are also solution sets (for example, it guaran-
tees that f 1ð f ðTÞÞ is a solution set for any solution set S and reduction
map f ).
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Note by the way that, if you do not include minimality, the requirements
(1), (3) and (4) are quite natural for a stability-like concept6.
Deﬁnition 3. A solution s is regular if for any game G
(1) sðGÞ0 f (non-emptiness property)
(2) the ‘projection’ f ðTÞ of an element T of sðG 0Þ is an element of sðGÞ for
all pairs ðG 0; f Þ with G 0 !f G (projection property)
(3) if a sequence S1;S2; . . . of elements of sðGÞ dH -converges to S, then S is
also an element of sðGÞ (closedness property)
(4) every closed set T containing an element of sðGÞ is also an element of
sðGÞ (monotonicity property).
In order to explain the idea behind our procedure, note that the examples
8 and 10 in Vermeulen and Jansen (1997a) show that above-mentioned solu-
tions like essentiality and quasi-stability (including the minimality condition)
are not KM-invariant. This is partly due to the minimality condition and
partly to the basic deﬁnitions of these solutions. Thus we need a more careful
selection than just requiring minimality. Our selection method is split in two
steps. In the ﬁrst step we take care of a (possible) ﬂaw in the basic deﬁnition of
the solution. In the second step we adapt the minimality condition.
Step 1. In order to introduce our modiﬁcation of a regular solution s we
ﬁrst consider, for a game G , the class ~sðGÞ of those sets S in sðGÞ for which
f 1ðSÞ A sðG 0Þ for all pairs ðG 0; f Þ with G 0 !f G . Such sets are called
extension-stable (e-stable for short).
We will show that the solution ~s is invariant and that ~sðGÞ is not empty for
all G.
Theorem 2. Let s be a regular solution and let G be a game. Then
(a) there is at least one e-stable set for G
(b) every e-stable set for G contains a minimal e-stable set for G .
In particular, ~sðGÞ is not empty.
Proof: (a) First we will show that the strategy space D of G is an e-stable set.
So let ðG 0; f Þ be a pair with G 0 !f G. Then the non-emptiness property and
the monotonicity of s imply that f 1ðDÞ ¼ D 0 A sðG 0Þ.
(b) Now we prove that each e-stable set S contains a minimal e-stable set.
If S is not minimal, take a sequence S1IS2I    of e-stable sets for the
game G contained in S. Let ðG 0; f Þ be a pair with G 0 !f G . Then f 1ðS1ÞI
f 1ðS2ÞI    are elements of sðG 0Þ. Because the sequence f 1ðS1Þ;
f 1ðS2Þ; . . . dH -converges to 7i f 1ðSiÞ, the closedness property of s implies
that f 1 7
i
Si
  ¼7
i
f 1ðSiÞ A sðG 0Þ. Hence, 7i Si is an e-stable set for G .
Then Zorn’s lemma implies that S contains a minimal e-stable set. /
6 In the particular case of the monotonicity requirement we are speciﬁcally thinking of a stability
concept. As we already argued, the minimality condition destroys invariance. Therefore we like to
start with sets that satisfy the basic robustness requirement against small perturbations, and that
automatically gives you a monotonic solution.
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In order to prove, for a regular solution s, the invariance of the solution ~s, we
need a lemma and some notation. Let G be a game. Suppose that ðG 0; f Þ and
ðG 00; gÞ are two pairs with G 0 !f G and G 00 !g G .
Lemma 2. There are maps h and k and a game ~G such that h is a reduction map
from ~G to G 0, k is a reduction map from ~G to G 00, and f  h ¼ g  k.
Proof: Write G ¼ hA; ui, G 0 ¼ hB; vi and G 00 ¼ hC;wi. We will ﬁrst con-
struct the map h and the game ~G ¼ hD; zi. Since fi is an onto map from DðBiÞ
to DðAiÞ, we can choose for each pure strategy ci A Ci some strategy ziðciÞ in
DðBiÞ such that fiðziðciÞÞ ¼ giðciÞ.
Assume w.l.o.g. that Bi and Ci are disjoint. Deﬁne Di :¼ BiWCi. Let
hi : DðDiÞ ! DðBiÞ be the a‰ne (extension of the) map satisfying, for di A Di
hiðdiÞ :¼
di if di A Bi
ziðdiÞ if di A Ci:

Now deﬁne the payo¤ function of ~G by zi :¼ ui  f  h with h :¼ ðhiÞi AN . Then
h is a reduction map from ~G to G 0 since each hi is a‰ne and onto, and
zi ¼ ui  f  h ¼ vi  h.
Furthermore, if we deﬁne maps ki for each player i in an analogous way, it
is straightforward to check that each ki is a‰ne and onto, and f  h ¼ g  k by
the construction of h and k. Finally, this observation implies that
zi ¼ ui  f  h ¼ ui  g  k ¼ wi  k
and k is a reduction map from ~G to G 00. /
We need this result in the proof of
Proposition 1. Let f be a reduction map from a game G 0 to a game G . Then
(1) f 1ðSÞ is an e-stable set for G 0 whenever S is an e-stable set for G
(2) f ðTÞ is an e-stable set for G whenever T is an e-stable set for G 0.
Proof: (a) In order to prove (1), let g be a reduction map from a game G 00
to G 0. Then, g1ð f 1ðSÞÞ ¼ ð f  gÞ1ðSÞ is an element of sðG 00Þ since f  g is
clearly a reduction map from G 00 to G and S is e-stable. Hence, f 1ðSÞ is an
e-stable set for G 0.
(b) Let g be a reduction map from a game G 00 to G . Choose the game ~G
and reduction maps h and k as in Lemma 2. First we will show that kðh1ðTÞÞ
is an element of sðG 00Þ. To this end, note that h1ðTÞ is an element of sð ~GÞ,
since T is an e-stable set for G 0. So kðh1ðTÞÞ is an element of sðG 00Þ by the
projection property of s. Secondly, kðh1ðTÞÞ is a subset of g1ð f ðTÞÞ, since
gðkðh1ðTÞÞÞ ¼ ðg  kÞðh1ðTÞÞ ¼ ð f  hÞðh1ðTÞÞ ¼ f ðTÞ:
From these facts and the monotonicity of s it follows that g1ð f ðTÞÞ is an
element of sðG 00Þ. /
From the foregoing proposition it is immediately clear that, for a regular
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solution s, the solution ~s is invariant. Yet, due to the other requirements of
Kohlberg and Mertens, this modiﬁcation is not satisfactory. E.g. the strategy
space D of a game is always an e-stable set, which shows that the solution
~s cannot be admissible (see section 6.1), even if the solution s is. Therefore,
given a regular solution s, we need to select from the class ~sðGÞ a number
of well-behaved solution sets that will constitute our modiﬁed solution. At
ﬁrst sight the selection of all minimal e-stable sets seems to be a reasonable
attempt. However, the ‘projection’ of a minimal e-stable set need not be min-
imal, so that this choice need not yield an invariant solution. Nevertheless, for
example the admissibility requirement forces us to choose only ‘fairly small’
e-stable sets for the modiﬁed solution.
Step 2. For these reasons we consider the class smodðGÞ of those e-stable sets
S for G for which there exists a pair ðG 0; f Þ with G 0 !f G and a minimal
e-stable set T for G 0 such that f ðTÞ ¼ S.
Deﬁnition 4. For a regular solution s, we call the solution smod as introduced
before the modiﬁed solution.
First of all we note that, for all games G , smodðGÞ is a subset of sðGÞ. Further,
~sðGÞ contains at least all minimal e-stable sets for G . So Theorem 2 implies
that smodðGÞ is not empty for any game G . In section 6 we will moreover show
that the modiﬁcation smod of a regular solution s inherits several properties of
the original solution. Furthermore,
Theorem 3. The modiﬁcation smod of a regular solution s is invariant.
Proof: Let f be a reduction map from a game G 0 to a game G . The proof
consists of two parts.
(a) In this part we will prove that f ðSÞ A smodðGÞ if S A smodðG 0Þ.
If S A smodðG 0Þ, there exists a reduction map g from a game G 00 to G 0 and a
minimal e-stable set U for G 00 such that gðUÞ ¼ S. Hence, f ðSÞ ¼ f ðgðUÞÞ ¼
ð f  gÞðUÞ while f  g is a reduction map from G 00 to G . So f ðSÞ is the image
under f  g of the minimal e-stable set U for G 00 and therefore an element of
smodðGÞ.
(b) Now we will show that for each T A smodðGÞ there is an S A smodðG 0Þ
with T ¼ f ðSÞ.
If T A smodðGÞ, then there exists a reduction map g from a game G 00 to G
and a minimal e-stable set U for G 00 such that gðUÞ ¼ T . Choose ~G , h and k as
in Lemma 2. Now, according to Proposition 1 (1), k1ðUÞ is an e-stable set for
~G . So, by Theorem 2, k1ðUÞ contains a minimal e-stable set, say V, for the
game ~G . So, by the deﬁnition of smod , S :¼ hðVÞ A smodðG 0Þ. Furthermore,
according to Proposition 1 (2), kðV ÞHU is an e-stable set for G 00. Since U is a
minimal e-stable set, kðVÞ ¼ U . Hence, by Lemma 2,
f ðSÞ ¼ f ðhðV ÞÞ ¼ ð f  hÞðV Þ ¼ ðg  kÞðV Þ ¼ gðkðV ÞÞ ¼ gðUÞ ¼ T : /
6. Some regular solutions
In this section we will give three examples of regular solutions that are based
on the notions of essentiality (Wu Wen-tsu¨n and Jiang Jia-he (1962)), BR-
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stability and quasi-stability (Hillas (1990)), respectively. The main di¤erence
with the original deﬁnitions is the absence of a minimality requirement. The
omission of this requirement immediately yields monotonic solution, one of
the requirements for regularity. Of course, starting with one of these solutions
including the minimality condition, one might as well take the monotonic
closure (in the set-theoretic sense) of the solution as the basis for the modiﬁ-
cation procedure.
A closed subset S of the strategy space D of a game G is called essential
if for any neighborhood V of S there is a neighborhood U of G such that
Eð ~GÞXV is not empty for all ~G A U .
It is well known (cf. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) that the solution sES
that assigns to a game the collection of essential sets of that game is not invari-
ant. However, the modiﬁcation of this solution is invariant by Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4. The solution sES that assigns to a game the collection of essential
sets of that game is regular.
Proof: Let G be a game. We need to check the requirements of Deﬁnition 3.
Since (4) is obvious, we will only check the other requirements.
(1) By Proposition 1 of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), sESðGÞ is non-
empty.
(2) Let f be a reduction map from a game G 0 ¼ hB; vi to the game
G ¼ hA; ui and let T be an essential set of G 0. Let V be a neighborhood
of f ðTÞ. Then f 1ðV Þ is a neighborhood of T. Since T is an essential set
of G 0, there is a number d > 0 such that EðG 00ÞX f 1ðV Þ is not empty for
all G 00 A BdðG 0Þ. Now take a ﬁxed ~G A BdðGÞ, say ~G ¼ hA; ~ui. Now consider
the game ~Gf ¼ hB; ~vi, where ~vi :¼ ~ui  f . Then obviously, ~Gf !f ~G and
~Gf A BdðG 0Þ. So Eð ~Gf ÞX f 1ðVÞ is not empty. For an x A Eð ~Gf ÞX f 1ðVÞ
however, Lemma 1 implies that f ðxÞ A Eð ~GÞXV . Hence, f ðTÞ is an essential
set of G .
(3) Suppose that S1;S2; . . . is a sequence of essential sets for G dH -
converging to a set S. If V is a neighborhood of S, then Si0HV for some
large i0. Since Si0 is essential for G , there is a neighborhood U of G such that
Eð ~GÞXV is not empty for all ~G A U . So S is essential for G . /
Next we describe two stability concepts introduced by Hillas (1990). We start
with some deﬁnitions. For two compact- and convex-valued upper hemi-
continuous (uhc) correspondences j;c : D ! D
dyðj;cÞ :¼ maxfdHðjðxÞ;cðxÞÞ j x A Dg
and ﬁxðjÞ :¼ fx A D j x A jðxÞg is the set of ﬁxed points of j.
Following the idea of Hillas (1990), a closed set SHD is called a BR-set if
for any neighborhood V of S, there exists a number d > 0 such that ﬁxðjÞXV
is not empty if dyðb; jÞ < d.
Theorem 5. The solution sBR that assigns to a game the collection of BR-sets is
regular.
Proof: We only show that sBR has the projection property. To this end, let f
be a reduction map from a game G 0 to G and suppose that THD 0 is a BR-set
of G 0. We have to show that f ðTÞ is a BR-set of G .
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Let V be a neighborhood of f ðTÞ. Then f 1ðVÞ is a neighborhood of
T. So there is a number d > 0 such that ﬁxðcÞX f 1ðV Þ is not empty if
dyðc; bÞ < d. Furthermore, by Lemma 4 of Vermeulen and Jansen (1997a),
there exists a number h > 0 such that for any strategy proﬁle y A D 0 and z A D
with k f ðyÞ  zky < hd, there is a strategy proﬁle z 0 A D 0 with ky z 0ky < d
and f ðz 0Þ ¼ z.
Now let j : D ! D be a compact- and convex-valued uhc correspondence
with dyðj; bÞ < hd. We will show that ﬁxðjÞXV is not empty. To this end,
deﬁne the correspondence c : D 0 ! D 0 by
cðxÞ :¼ fy A D 0 j f ðyÞ A jð f ðxÞÞg:
Since j is a compact- and convex-valued uhc correspondence and f is linear,
also c is a compact- and convex-valued uhc correspondence. Furthermore,
dyðc; bÞ < d as we will show now.
Suppose that y A cðxÞ. Then f ðyÞ A jð f ðxÞÞ. Since dyðj; bÞ < hd, there
is a z A bð f ðxÞÞ with k f ðyÞ  zky < hd. So a z 0 A D 0 can be found such thatky z 0ky < d and f ðz 0Þ ¼ z. Then z 0 A bðxÞ by Lemma 1. Hence, cðxÞH
BdðbðxÞÞ. In an analogous way, one proves that bðxÞHBdðcðxÞÞ.
The foregoing implies that ﬁxðcÞX f 1ðVÞ is not empty. So we can
take an x A ﬁxðcÞX f 1ðV Þ. Then f ðxÞ A ﬁxðjÞ and f ðxÞ A V . Hence
ﬁxðjÞXV is not empty. /
Finally, we come to the second stability concept introduced by Hillas.
Let, for a game G and for each player i, ei : PðAiÞ ! ½0; 1 be a mapping,
where PðAiÞ is the class of all non-empty proper subsets of Ai. We call
e :¼ ðeiÞi AN a perturbation system for G . For such a perturbation system e, G ½e
is the game where, for all i, the strategy space of player i is restricted to
DiðeÞ :¼ fxi A Di j xiðTÞb eiðTÞ for all T A PðAiÞg with xiðTÞ :¼
P
a AT xia.
Note that the strategy spaces are full-dimensional if keky :¼ maxfeiðTÞ j i A N;
T A PðAiÞg is small.
Following Hillas (1990), a closed subset S of D is called a Q-set if for any
neighborhood V of S there is a number d > 0 such that EðG½eÞXV is not
empty, for all perturbation systems e with keky < d.
Since the solution sQ that assigns to a game the collection of Q-sets is not
invariant, the following theorem is important.
Theorem 6. The solution sQ that assigns to a game the collection of Q-sets is
regular.
Proof: We only show that sQ has the projection property. Let f be a reduc-
tion map from a game G 0 to the game G . Let S be a Q-set of G 0. In order to
prove that f ðSÞ is a Q-set of the game G, we ﬁrst note that f ðSÞ is a closed,
non-empty set.
Now take a neighborhood V of f ðSÞ. We have to show that there exists
a number d > 0 such that G ½eXV is not empty whenever keky < d. To this
end, note that there is a number d > 0 such that EðG 0½xÞX f 1ðVÞ is not
empty for every perturbation system x for G 0 with kxky < d, since S is a Q-set
of G 0 and f 1ðV Þ is a neighborhood of S.
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Now take a perturbation system e for G with keky < d. We will show that
EðG½eÞ and V have a non-empty intersection. Deﬁne the perturbation system
~e for the game G 0 as follows. Write G ¼ hA; ui and G 0 ¼ hB; vi. By Lemma 1
of Vermeulen and Jansen (1997a) we know that each Ai is a subset of fiðBiÞ.
Thus we can choose a subset Ci of Bi such that fi is one-to-one and onto from
Ci to Ai. Now deﬁne for a player i and proper subset T of Bi
~eiðTÞ :¼ eið fiðTÞÞ if THCi and f0T0Ci
0 otherwise.

Obviously, since keky < d, k~eky < d. Hence, EðG 0½~e ÞX f 1ðVÞ is not empty,
and we can take a strategy x A EðG 0½~e ÞX f 1ðVÞ. Then f ðxÞ A V , and the
proof is complete if we can show that f ðxÞ A EðG ½eÞ. Since for all i A N, and
all proper subsets T of Ci
fiðxÞð fiðTÞÞb xiðTÞb ~eiðTÞ ¼ eið fiðTÞÞ;
and every proper subset of Ai is equal to a set of the form fiðTÞ for exactly
one proper subset T of Ci, we know that f ðxÞ is an element of DðeÞ. Now let
yi A DiðeÞ. Deﬁne zi A D 0i by
zib :¼ yifiðbÞ if b A Ci
0 else.

It is straightforward to show that zi is an element of Dið~eÞ, and fiðziÞ ¼ yi.
Hence,
uið f ðxÞi j yiÞ ¼ uið f ðxÞi j fiðziÞÞ ¼ viðxijziÞa viðxijxiÞ ¼ uið f ðxÞÞ:
Since yi was arbitrarily chosen, f ðxÞ A EðG½eÞ. /
7. On properties of modiﬁed regular solutions
In this section we will investigate which properties of a regular solution s are
inherited by its modiﬁcation smod .
7.1. Admissible best reply invariance
The ﬁrst property we will study is abr-invariance. Mertens (1987) showed that
an abr-invariant solution that also satisﬁes a strong version of invariance is
ordinal. In this section we will show that our modiﬁcation method preserves
abr-invariance. As a consequence, any solution that will satisfy the stronger
version of invariance after modiﬁcation will be ordinal. In particular this
holds for homotopy stability.
Two games G ¼ hA; ui and G  ¼ hA; ui are called admissible-best-reply-
equivalent (abr-equivalent) if the admissible best replies in the game G coincide
with those in the game G . A solution t is called abr-invariant (cf. Mertens
(1987)) if tðGÞ equals tðG Þ for any pair of abr-equivalent games G and G .
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In order to show that the solution smod is abr-invariant if s is, we need the
following result that can easily be proved with the help of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. If two games G and G  are abr-equivalent, then Gf and G f are abr-
equivalent for any reduction map f .
Obviously, given that s is abr-invariant, this lemma together with Proposition
1 implies that a closed subset of DA is e-stable for the game G if and only if it is
e-stable for the game G . Hence, smod is abr-invariant if s has this property.
7.2. Connectedness, admissibility and backward induction
Theorem 7 (Connectedness). Let s be a regular solution. If, for a game G , every
minimal element of sðGÞ is connected, then all elements of smodðGÞ are con-
nected.
Proof: The proof consists of two parts.
(a) First we will show that every minimal e-stable set for G is connected. So
take a minimal e-stable set T for G and suppose that T is not connected. Then
there are two disjoint non-empty closed sets T1 and T2 in D with T1WT2 ¼ T .
Furthermore, T1 and T2 are no e-stable sets for G, since T is minimal. Then
there are pairs ðG 0; f Þ and ðG 00; gÞ with G 0 !g G and G 00 !g G such that
f 1ðT1Þ is not an element of sðG 0Þ and g1ðT2Þ is not an element of sðG 00Þ.
Let ~G, h and k be as in Lemma 2. Then, by the projection property of s,
h1ð f 1ðT1ÞÞ ¼ ð f  hÞ1ðT1Þ is not an element of sð ~GÞ and k1ðg1ðT1ÞÞ ¼
ðg  kÞ1ðT1Þ is not an element of sð ~GÞ.
However, by Proposition 1 we know that ð f  hÞ1ðTÞ is an element of
sð ~GÞ, since T is an e-stable set for G . Consequently
ð f  hÞ1ðTÞ ¼ ð f  hÞ1ðT1ÞW ð f  hÞ1ðT2Þ
¼ ð f  hÞ1ðT1ÞW ðg  kÞ1ðT2Þ
contains a minimal, hence connected, element of sð ~GÞ. Since ð f  hÞ1ðT1Þ
and ðg  kÞ1ðT2Þ are non-empty, closed and disjoint sets, that connected ele-
ment of sð ~GÞ must be contained in one of these sets. Therefore, one of these
sets is an element of sð ~GÞ by the monotonicity property of s, which yields a
contradiction.
(b) Let S be an element of smodðGÞ. Then there is a pair ðG 0; f Þ with
G 0 !f G and a minimal e-stable set T for G 0 with f ðTÞ ¼ S. From part (a)
it follows that T is connected. Hence, S must be connected since f is contin-
uous. /
Deﬁnition 5. A solution s is called perfect-valued if, for every game G, each
minimal element of sðGÞ is contained in PEðGÞ.
In the proof of the next theorem we use the following result of Vermeulen and
Jansen (1997a).
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Lemma 4. Let f be a reduction map from a game G 0 to G. Then the set of
perfect equilibria of the game G 0 equals the inverse image under f of the set of
perfect equilibria of G .
Theorem 8 (Admissibility). If s is a perfect-valued, regular solution, then all
elements of smodðGÞ are contained in PEðGÞ.
Proof: Again the proof is in two parts.
(a) First we show that every minimal e-stable set for G is contained in
PEðGÞ. Let S be an e-stable set for G . Take a pair ðG 0; f Þ with G 0 !f G .
Then, f 1ðSÞ is an element of sðG 0Þ. By the assumption in the theorem
and the monotonicity of s, this implies that f 1ðSÞXPEðG 0Þ is an element
of sðG 0Þ. Since by Lemma 4, f 1ðSÞXPEðG 0Þ ¼ f 1ðSÞX f 1ðPEðGÞÞ,
f 1ðSXPEðGÞÞ is an element of sðG 0Þ. Hence, SXPEðGÞ is an e-stable set
for G . Therefore, any minimal e-stable set for G is contained in PEðGÞ.
(b) Secondly we show that every element of smodðGÞ must be contained in
PEðGÞ. Suppose that S is an element of smodðGÞ. Then there is a pair ðG 0; f Þ
with G 0 !f G and a minimal e-stable set T for G 0 with f ðTÞ ¼ S. From part
(a) it follows that T is a subset of PEðG 0Þ. So, by Lemma 4, S ¼ f ðTÞH
f ðPEðG 0ÞÞ ¼ PEðGÞ. /
Since every element of smodðGÞ is also an element of sðGÞ, we have a proof of
Theorem 9 (Backward Induction). Let s be a regular solution. If, for every
game G , every element of sðGÞ contains a proper equilibrium, then all elements
of smodðGÞ contain a proper equilibrium.
7.3. Deletion of a strategy
In this section the preliminary work for the next section dealing with the
Independence of inadmissible strategies will be done.
Let G ¼ hA; ui be a ﬁxed game. We deal with the situation that one of the
pure strategies of player j, say b, is deleted. The game induced by the deletion
of b is the game G  ¼ hA; ui with
Ai ¼
Ai if i0 j
Ajnfbg if i ¼ j

and ui is the restriction of ui to
Q
i A

i .
For an xj A DðAjÞ0 :¼ fyj A DðAjÞ j yjb ¼ 0g, njðxjÞ is the strategy in DðAj Þ
obtained by the deletion of the b-coordinate of the strategy xj. In order to
analyze the interaction between reductions and the deletion of a strategy, let f
be a reduction map from a game ðG Þ0 ¼ hC; vi to the game G . Now we will
construct a reduction map g from a game G 0 to the game G . This construction
will be used frequently in the next sections. To this end let, for each c A Cj,
zjðcÞ in DðAjÞ be the strategy obtained from fjðcÞ A DðAj Þ by inserting a zero
as the b-coordinate. Deﬁne Dj :¼ Cj W fbg and let gj : DðDjÞ ! DðAjÞ be the
linear extension of the map deﬁned by
gjðdÞ :¼
b if d ¼ b
zjðdÞ if d A Cj:

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If m : DðDjÞ0 ! DðCjÞ is the map associated with the deletion of b, the fol-
lowing lemma implies that the diagram
DðDjÞ0 !mj DðCjÞ???ygj
???yfj
DðAjÞ0 !nj DðAbj Þ
commutes.
Lemma 5. nj  gj ¼ fj  mj .
Proof: Note that gjðxjÞ A DðAjÞ0 for all xj A DðDjÞ0. We only have to prove
that ðnj  gjÞðdÞ ¼ ð fj  mjÞðdÞ for all d A Djnfbg, since all maps involved are
linear. However,
njðgjðdÞÞ ¼ njðzjðdÞÞ ¼ fjðdÞ ¼ fjðmjðdÞÞ: /
Now let, for all i0 j, gi from DðDiÞ :¼ DðCiÞ to DðAiÞ ¼ DðAi Þ be equal to fi.
Then, for g :¼ ðgiÞi AN the game Gg is well deﬁned.
Lemma 6. ðG Þ0 ¼ ðGgÞ.
Proof: Note that both games have DC as strategy space. So, we have to show
that vi ¼ ðui  gÞ. Take an x in DC . Then there is a strategy proﬁle z A DD
with zjb ¼ 0 and mðzÞ ¼ x. Hence,
viðxÞ ¼ viðmðzÞÞ ¼ ðui  f ÞðmðzÞÞ ¼ ðui  n  gÞðzÞ ¼ ðui  gÞðzÞ
¼ ðui  gÞðmðzÞÞ ¼ ðui  gÞðxÞ
where the third equality follows from Lemma 5. /
7.4. Independence of inadmissible strategies
In this section G will again be a ﬁxed game. First we suppose that S is an
e-stable set for G.
Lemma 7. Suppose that the pure strategy b of player j is not an admissible best
reply to S in the game G . Then it is not an admissible best reply to g1ðSÞ in the
game Gg.
Proof: Suppose that the pure strategy b of player j in the game Gg is an admis-
sible best reply to g1ðSÞ. Then a strategy proﬁle x A g1ðSÞ can be found such
that b A Baj ðxjÞ. Hence there is a completely mixed sequence ðxkÞk AN in DD
converging to x such that b A bjðxkjÞ for all k. Then however, ðgðxkÞÞk AN is a
completely mixed sequence in DA converging to gðxÞ A S and, for all k,
b ¼ gjðbÞ A bjðgðxkÞjÞ:
This leads to b A Baj ðSÞ. Contradiction. /
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Deﬁnition 6. A perfect-valued solution t is independent of inadmissible strat-
egies if for any game G the following holds: if S A tðGÞ and b B Baj ðSÞ, then
S 0 :¼ nðSXD0Þ contains an element of tðG Þ. Here G  is the game induced by
the deletion of the pure strategy b of player j in the game G .
Theorem 10 (Independence of inadmissible strategies). If s is a perfect-valued,
regular solution that is independent of inadmissible strategies, then smod is inde-
pendent of inadmissible strategies.
Proof: Let S A smodðGÞ and b B Baj ðSÞ. To show: the set S 0 contains an ele-
ment of smodðG Þ.
(a) Since S is e-stable, we can choose a minimal e-stable subset T of S by
Theorem 2 (b). Since each e-stable set of G  contains a minimal e-stable set of
G , and hence an element of smodðG Þ by Theorem 2 (b), it is su‰cient to
show that T 0HS 0 is an e-stable set for G .
(b) In order to show that T 0 is an e-stable set for the game G , we take a
reduction map f from a game ðG Þ0 to the game G . Let g be the reduction
map from Gg to G as constructed in the previous section. Then, since T is
minimal e-stable, and hence an element of smodðGÞ, g1ðTÞ is an element of
sðGgÞ. Moreover, since T A sðGÞ and s is perfect-valued,
g1ðTÞH g1ðPEðGÞÞ ¼ PEðGgÞH fx A DD j xjb ¼ 0g:
This implies that mðg1ðTÞÞ ¼ g1ðTÞ0. Therefore, since s is monotonous and
independent of inadmissible strategies, mðg1ðTÞÞ is an element of sððGgÞÞ.
So, mðg1ðTÞÞ is an element of sððG Þ0Þ by Lemma 6. Furthermore, in view of
Lemma 5,
f ðmðg1ðTÞÞÞ ¼ ð f  mÞðg1ðTÞÞ ¼ ðn  gÞðg1ðTÞÞ ¼ nðTÞ ¼ T 0;
which implies that mðg1ðTÞÞ is a subset of f 1ðT 0Þ. Hence, by monotonicity,
f 1ðT 0Þ is an element of sððG Þ0Þ. Therefore, T 0 is an e-stable set of the game
G . /
8. Final remarks
Let us ﬁnally stress that it is possible to ﬁnd other ways to modify a solution in
order to obtain an invariant one. However, if we insist on preservation of the
requirements of the Kohlberg-Mertens properties, this does require a careful
selection procedure. To our knowledge, the modiﬁcation presented here is the
ﬁrst one to preserve all requirements Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) originally
mentioned.
To give an example of an alternative modiﬁcation, let s be a given solu-
tion. We call a closed set S in the strategy space of a game G d-stable if
pðSÞ A sðG Þ, where G  is the reduced normal form of G and p is the asso-
ciated reduction map. Consider the solution s 0 that assigns the collection
s 0ðGÞ of minimal d-stable sets to G . Then one can show that s 0 is invariant
and not empty whenever the original solution s is not empty and satisﬁes the
closedness property. In the next example we show that by modifying the solu-
tion sQ in this way the backward induction property is lost.
Example 3. Reducing the game
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G ¼
ð6; 0Þ ð6; 0Þ
ð8; 0Þ ð0; 8Þ
ð0; 8Þ ð8; 0Þ
ð3; 4Þ ð7; 0Þ
2
6664
3
7775;
leads to
G  ¼
2
64 ð6; 0Þ ð6; 0Þð8; 0Þ ð0; 8Þ
ð0; 8Þ ð8; 0Þ
3
75:
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that sQðG Þ ¼
ðe1; qÞ A D3  D2 j
q1 A 14 ;
1
2 ;
3
4
 
. Now, for any d-stable set S for the game G , we know that
ðe1; qÞ A S for q1 A 14 ; 12 ; 34
 
. This implies that
s 0QðGÞ ¼ fTg;
where T ¼ ðe1; qÞ A D4  D2 j q1 A 14 ; 12 ; 34
  
. The set T however does not
contain the only proper equilibrium e1;
7
12 ;
5
12
  
of the game G. Note that
all quasi-stable sets contain a proper equilibrium and that ðsQÞmodðGÞ ¼fEðGÞg. /
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